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In the summer of 1994 the German legislature adopted the Second Financial
Markets Improvement Act, 1 an omnibus act with the primary goal of strengthening
Germany's position as a financial marketplace. On the one hand, this act amends
more than a dozen statutes with the goal of enhancing the efficiency of regulated
capital markets and widening investment possibilities for domestic and foreign
funds.2 On the other hand, the omnibus act introduces a new Securities Trading
Act (German Act). The German Act provides for the creation of a supervisory
government agency, the Federal Securities Office (Securities Office), 4 and aligns
German law with the European Community directives on insider trading (EC
Insider Trading Directive), 5 the disclosure of major holdings in listed corpora-
tions,6 and the conduct of firms providing investment services in the securities
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1. Zweites Finanzmarktf6rderungsgesetz, BGB1. 1 1994, 1749.
2. See Jutta Schneider, Germany: Financial Regulation, 1 J. INT'L BANKING L. N-9 (1995).
3. Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, BGBI. 11994, 1749 (art. 1) [hereinafter German Act]. The transla-
tions are provided by the author.
4. Bundesaufsichtsamt fir den Wertpapierhandel.
5. Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing
1989, O.J. (L 334) 130 [hereinafter EC Insider Trading Directive].
6. Council Directive 88/627 of 12 December 1988 On the Information to Be Published When
a Major Holding in a Listed Company Is Acquired or Disposed of 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62.
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field.7 With all of these changes in place, German securities law has entered a
new era.
I. Insider Trading
The most prominent feature of the German Act is that the ban on insider trading
is now rooted in the law. Formerly, insider trading was prohibited under a set
of self-regulatory rules that became binding upon individuals on a contractual
basis' and did not provide for criminal sanctions. 9 What appeared to be most
harmful to the reputation of German capital markets, however, was the absence
of any means by which to prove or refute allegations of systematic insider viola-
tions and trading fraud on the Frankfurt stock exchange.'0
A. CORNERSTONES OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
With the new regime, Germany has caught up with international standards.
Insider trading is a criminal offense with a penalty of up to five years' imprison-
ment." Any transaction in securities or derivatives is to be disclosed to the Securi-
ties Office.' 2 The Securities Office is vested with broad powers to investigate
alleged violations and initiate prosecutions."
With a view toward the drafting of the relevant provisions, the German legisla-
ture closely followed the EC Insider Trading Directive. " Following this directive
has resulted in a regime that approaches insider trading through a couple of
definitions circumscribing the now unlawful conduct. This result sharply contrasts
with the law on insider trading in the United States, which has developed out
of the general antifraud provisions contained in Section 10(b) of the Securities
7. Council Directive 93/22 of 10 May 1993 On Investment Services in the Securities Field
1993 O.J. (L 141) 27 [hereinafter Council Directive of 10 May 1993].
8. Guidelines of the Stock Exchange Expert Commission (B6rsensachverstiindigenkommission),
reprinted in ADOLF BAUMBACH & KLAUS J. HoPT, HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] (29th ed. 1994).
See generally Klaus J. Hopt, The German Insider Trading Guidelines: Spring-gun or Scarecrow?
8 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 381 (1986); Siegfried H. Eising & Donna Gasser, Stock Exchange
Rules in Germany and the Treatment of Insider Trading, 14 INT'L Bus. L. 191 (1986).
9. Before enactment of the German Act, criminal liability of insiders was more or less nonexistent
(petty offense; prosecution on request only); see Martin Weber, Deutsches Kapitalmarktrecht im
Umbruch, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2849, 2851 (1994).
10. See Terence Roth, Scandals Spur Moves in Germany for Laws to Battle Insider Trading,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1991, at A5A. But see Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Kein Papiertiger, aber
Auslegungsprobleme, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNo, Aug. 5, 1994.
11. German Act §§ 14, 38.
12. Id. § 9.
13. As to the enforcement of the duties under the German Act, see infra text accompanying
notes 192-99.
14. Pursuant to article 189(3) of the EEC Treaty, directives are binding only with respect to
the results to be achieved thereunder. Therefore, the German legislature was free to decide whether
to follow the definitional approach of the EC Insider Trading Directive or to arrive at the same
results under a different concept. See generally HANS SMIT & PETER E. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY §§ 189.11-13 (1976).
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Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Act of
1933. Rule lOb-5 was initially enacted to provide the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) with the power to investigate and seek injunctive relief in
situations in which insiders who were buying their companies' stock were telling
the shareholders that the company was doing badly, when to the contrary, the
company was prospering. 1 5 But the actual application of Rule lOb-5 has grown
far beyond what its drafters intended. The courts have approved application of
the rule to the typical paradigm of silent trading 16 as well as to trading by tippees
and other outsiders. 17 Moreover, the courts have allowed an implied private right
of action,'8 which may have been the most important factor in making Rule 1Ob-5
a powerful weapon against insider trading. Complementary to this regime, special
rules pertain to trading in the tender offer context' 9 and to short swing transactions
of directors, officers, and substantial shareholders.20
The German Act appears much less complex than its U.S. counterpart. The
new regime's cornerstone is a rule that forbids anyone, not just insiders, from
taking advantage of inside information by acquiring or disposing of insider securi-
ties." Insiders, as opposed to third parties, are subject to additional duties.22 This
prohibition is self-contained and, unlike its fraud-oriented U.S. counterpart,23
does not present a base for the incorporation of a fiduciary element. Yet, even
with all these terms in place, questions arise with respect to their meaning. The
following analysis first deals with the technical terms employed, such as insider,
insider securities, and inside information. The analysis then proceeds to a discus-
sion of obligations, sanctions, enforcement, and related issues.
B. INSIDER SECURITIES
To describe the arena where the German Act will attack insider traders, the
best approach is to begin with the securities that would qualify as the objects of
illegal insider trading activity. The scope of the German and the U.S. laws is
very different in this respect. Rule 1Ob-5 covers conduct "in connection with
15. See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 778-79 (3d ed. 1995); ROBERT
W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 944 (4th ed. 1990).
16. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
17. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); In
re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
18. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Some situations are covered under the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 that added a new § 20A to the Exchange
Act.
19. SEC Rule 14e-3.
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16.
21. German Act § 14.
22. Id.
23. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961).
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the purchase or sale of any security. 2 4 That language synchronizes the scope
of the rule with the broad definition of a security in Section 3(a)(10) of the
Exchange Act, and the courts have used Rule lOb-5 as a tool with quite universal
coverage.2 5 Even though the rule is recognized as a catch-all provision, its univer-
sality is limited to fraud. Therefore, one who fails to disclose material information
before consummating the transaction commits fraud only when under a duty to
disclose such material information. Such a duty arises when the other party is
entitled to be informed of the material information because of a fiduciary relation-
ship or other similar relationship of trust and confidence.26 It appears that such
a relationship can be clearly established when the insider's trading partner is a
stockholder in the corporation, 27 but the fiduciary duty principle broadens when
the trading involves securities other than common or preferred stock, such as
warrants or bonds.28
The German Act does not refer to fiduciary duties, but functions on a defini-
tional basis alone. Traders can incur liability only with regard to a set of securities
defined as insider securities. Insider securities are stock, depositary receipts, 29
bonds, bonus shares,3 ° warrants, and other instruments equivalent to stock or
bonds3 when these securities are traded on a stock exchange in Germany32 or the
European Economic Area. 33 Furthermore, insider obligations arise with regard to
contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire, or dispose of securities, options,
index contracts, and futures. 34 These provisions mirror the requirements enumer-
ated in the EC Insider Trading Directive except for the listing requirement.
The directive would cover the first and second segments of the German market,
but not the third where neither regulation nor supervision by public authorities
occurs. 35 The German legislature included the third segment because the public
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5.
25. For example, it does not play a role whether the purchase or sale is conducted in the organized
markets or face-to-face. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. at 12. As to what constitutes
a purchase or sale, see infra text accompanying notes 145-49.
26. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228, 235.
27. See Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932).
28. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVEN-
TION 87 (Clark Boardman Callaghan Securities Law Series Vol. 18, 1991).
29. Zertifikate, die Aktien vertreten.
30. Genussscheine. For nature of and rights conferred by this hybrid security, see the Federal
Supreme Court in BGHZ 119, 305.
31. German Act § 2. Compare art. l(2)(a) of the EC Insider Trading Directive: "shares and
debt securities, as well as securities equivalent to shares and debt securities."
32. This includes all the three segments of German stock exchanges: amtlicher Handel, geregelter
Markt, and Freiverkehr.
33. German Act § 12; see Agreement Establishing the European Economic Area, reprinted in
O.J. (L 1) (1994).
34. German Act § 12(2).
35. EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, art. 1(2) (when admitted to trading on a market
which is regulated and supervised by authorities recognized by public bodies, operates regularly and
is accessible directly or indirectly to the public).
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perceives the stock exchange to be divided into three segments and would not
understand why insider trading should be illegal in only two of them. Nonetheless
in terms of the scope of securities covered, the German Act is still narrower
than the regime in the United States.
Germany also decided to exercise its power under article 6 of the EC Insider
Trading Directive to adopt standards more stringent than those prescribed by the
directive. Germany has attached the restrictions on insider trading also to securi-
ties not yet listed when either their admission to the stock exchange has been
requested of the competent authorities, or such intention has been announced to
the public (Handelper Erscheinen).36 The German Act thus takes a middle position
between the EC Insider Trading Directive and the law that developed under Rule
10b-5.
The formal approach of defining insider securities is meritorious because it
promotes legal certainty by avoiding conceptual inconsistencies. This approach
shortcuts changing precedents such as those handed down by the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding the economic reality concept37 for purposes of construing the
term security under Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act. The ban on insider
trading in options under Section 20(d) of the Exchange Act, as amended in 1984,
operates without any fiduciary duty concept. By contrast, liability for insider
trading in debt securities under Rule lOb-5 requires the violation of a fiduciary
duty. However, the contractual relationship between issuers and investors in debt
securities does not comport with the notions of common law fraud and fiduciary
duties. Dicta from bankruptcy cases indicate that corporate debt-holders may be
owed fiduciary obligations of good faith and fair dealing, 3 but whether these
principles should be stretched to cases of insider trading is far from clear. The
misappropriation theory could possibly address many insider trading scenarios
dealing with debt-holders, but it appears that the trading by an issuer of bonds
on the basis of material nonpublic information would still escape redress. 9
Under the German Act, stock, options, and bonds are plainly defined as insider
36. German Act § 12(l)-(2).
37. Compare the broad and remedy-oriented approach in earlier decisions such as SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), and Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), with the attempt
to constrict the reach of the statute in later decisions such as United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975), International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), and Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), and the abandonment of the concept in Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), and Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
38. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Brown v. Presbyterian Ministers Fund, 484
F.2d 998, 1005 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 765 (1981).
39. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments: Insider Trading in
Non-Equity Securities, 49 Bus. LAW. 187, 213 (1993); see also R. Rene Pengra, Insider Trading,
Debt Securities, and Rule 1Ob-5: Evaluating the Fiduciary Relationship, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1354
(1992); Insider Trading in Junk Bonds, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1720 (1992).
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securities. Partnership interests and shares in limited liability companies 40 do not
trade on the stock exchange so that the German Act does not extend to the grey
capital market.41
Under U.S. law, substance controls, not form. The analysis focuses on whether
these interests are "investment contracts" within the meaning of Section 3(10)
of the Exchange Act. A security under Section 3(10) has been held to be "an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others." 42 With regard to both general and limited partnerships,
the partnership agreement and the limited partners' actual involvement in manage-
ment functions determine whether or not the partnership relies solely on the
efforts of others.43 The operations of general and limited partnerships are governed
by state law, which usually bars limited partners from participating in manage-
ment. In most cases, limited partnership interests are considered securities,
whereas general partnership interests are not.'
The courts have not yet dealt with the issue of whether interests in limited
liability companies (LLCs) are securities. Along the lines of the foregoing analy-
sis, cases would turn on the extent to which the LLC participants, under the
applicable LLC statute and the LLC operating agreement, are capable of meaning-
fully exercising management powers. 45 Depending on their assessment of the
normal LLC, observers disagree as to whether or not LLC interests are securi-
ties .46
C. INSIDE INFORMATION
Inside information is defined as "any fact unknown to the public and relating
to one or several issuers of insider securities or to insider securities themselves,
which, if it were made public, could have a material effect on the price of the
securities in question. , 47 This definition is comparatively broad, but it is not as
comprehensive as it might appear at first sight. Several aspects call for interpreta-
tion.
40. This applies to general partnership "GbR" and "OHG," as well as to the limited partnership
-KG" and the limited liability company "GmbH."
41. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ § 12 n.5 (Heinz-Dieter Assmann
& Uwe H. Schneider eds., 1995).
42. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
43. See Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1983); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d
736 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
44. See the case law quoted in MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION, LIABILITIES AND
REMEDIES § 4A.02[1] nn.24.6 & 24.7 (1994).
45. Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company as a Security, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 1105, 1114-15 (1992); Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests
Securities? 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1069, 1096 (1991).
46. See Steinberg & Conway, supra note 45; Sargent, supra note 45.
47. German Act § 13.
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1. Facts and Judgments
The definition of inside information refers to facts of a precise nature, and
the materials explain that this term is not to include personal opinions, value
judgments, and the like. 8 Such language suggests a sharp distinction between
objective and subjective information, but it is doubtful whether this concept is
workable in the context of insider trading.
First, U.S. practice suggests a gradual shading from objectively verifiable data
to information that inherently involves some subjective analysis or extrapolation
(soft information). Plans and proposals,49 projections and estimates,50 and infor-
mation that renders other information or assumptions unreliable 5 have been held
to give rise to liability. Thus, the concept of inside information embraces all
kinds of information, provided that there is a substantial likelihood that a reason-
able investor would consider such information important in making an investment
decision.52
Secondly, the statutory language in Section 13(2) of the German Act appears to
contradict the suggested distinction between objective and subjective information.
Section 13(2) pertains to evaluations of securities as they are frequently established
and disseminated by journalists and financial analysts. This section expressly
states that, even though such evaluations may substantially affect the market
price, they do not constitute inside information if they draw only on publicly
available data. Such language invites the conclusion that an evaluation constitutes
inside information if it incorporates data which are not publicly available, even
though an evaluation inherently involves subjective elements of extrapolation.
When reading the statutory language strictly, the ambiguity is limited to evalua-
tions. However, as U.S. practice illustrates, evaluations of securities account for
only one aspect of the problem of distinguishing between fact and opinion. The
ambiguity, therefore, arguably extends to every kind of information that inher-
ently involves some subjective analysis or extrapolation. This understanding finds
support in the language of the EC Insider Trading directive, which employs the
term information instead of facts. 3 Perhaps statutory language incorporating the
term facts should be given a more expansive construction generally. Commenta-
tors have suggested that cases should turn on whether the evaluation, buy or
sell recommendation, or other subjective information was accompanied by hard
facts..5 Yet, commentators seem to agree that knowledge of such a recommenda-
48. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6679 [hereinafter BT-DrS 12/6679] at 46.
49. SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
50. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
51. In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1989] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,444
(D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1988) [hereinafter Atlantic Litigation].
52. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
53. EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, art. 1(1). But this provision still requires informa-
tion to be of a precise nature.
54. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
[ZGR] 494, 510 (1994).
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tion may constitute inside information.55 This issue is important, as front-running
or scalping cases will turn on its resolution.
Because insider trading is a criminal offense, a broad interpretation of inside
information might clash with the principle that criminal statutes be constructed
strictly and that criminal liability cannot extend beyond the wording of the stat-
ute.56 With respect to the construction of statutes implementing EC Directives,
conformity with the directive is an important principle of construction. The litigat-
ing parties have the right to stay proceedings and submit the question of construc-
tion to the European Court of Justice, whose interpretation will bind the national
courts. 57 The concept of "soft" inside information is burdened with considerable
uncertainty such that those relying on a rather strict construction may unexpect-
edly find themselves in violation of the law.
2. Nonpublic Information
Nonpublic inside information is information unknown to the public. 5' Nonpub-
lic information is not synonymous with confidential information. Assuming that
markets are efficient, stock prices will reflect all relevant information. 59 There-
fore, the focus must be directed towards the moment when the market has digested
such information so that insiders no longer have an unfair advantage when they
trade in the securities concerned.
Neither the German Act nor the EC Insider Trading Directive offer guidance
as to when information should be considered known to the public. The materials
reveal that the German legislature did not intend the formal disclosure pursuant
to the Stock Exchange Act to be the standard. 6° Rather, the legislature followed
the concept of sectoral access (Bereichsoffentlichkeit), which assumes that infor-
mation is known to the public when market participants have had the opportunity
to learn of it. Thus, it is not the investing public as a whole, but the particular
sector of investors operating close to the market, whose access to disclosed
information will determine the borderline between nonpublic and publicly known
information.61
The sectoral access theory has been criticized for failing to place investors on
equal footing. 62 The criticism contests the legislature's belief that security prices
55. Klaus J. Hopt, FESTSCHRIFT FOR BEUSCH 393,409-10 [hereinafter Hopt, FS BEUSCH]; Klause
J. Hopt, ZGR 17, 34-35 (1991) [hereinafter Hopt, ZGR]; Claussen, DER BETRIEB [DB] 27, 28
(1994).
56. Albin Eser, in ADOLF SCH6NKE & HORST SCHRODER, STRAFGESETZBUCH § 1 n.24 (1991).
57. EEC Treaty, supra note 14, art. 177.
58. German Act § 13.
59. For an explanation of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and the different mechanisms
that incorporate information into the market price, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
60. See B6RSENZULASSUNGS-VERORDNUNG (of 15 April 1982, BGBI. 1 1234, as amended 26
July 1994, regulation pertaining to the admission of securities to Stock Exchange trading) § 70.
61. See Bundesrats-Drucksache 793/93 [hereinafter BR-DrS 793/93] at 142.
62. Weber, supra note 9, at 2852.
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will reflect all relevant information to which market participants have access and
that, for this reason, the market mechanism will suffice to efficiently protect
investors .63
This argument seems to be based on misunderstandings, the first of which
relates to the practice of suspending trade in securities when abnormally price-
sensitive information reaches the marketplace. Prior to the German Act, the stock
exchanges used to suspend trade in a particular security for the rest of the day
and wait for the morning newspapers to carry the information. This practice will
change. 6 The German Act is designed to enhance the efficiency of the capital
markets and allow for broader trading possibilities by speeding up the flow of
information to investors.65
Furthermore, the criticism seems to misunderstand the regulatory objective.
The prohibition of insider trading is not designed to place unsophisticated invest-
ors on an equal footing with professional market participants. Instead, it seeks
to prevent selected individuals close to the source of price-sensitive information
from deliberately exploiting it.66 Were the criticism taken literally, the whole
marketplace would be an assembly of insiders in possession of nonpublic informa-
tion. This position is out of touch with the realities of the market.67
The issue of when inside information becomes publicly known is closely con-
nected with the nature of inside information. U.S. practice suggests that the
outcome may vary with the circumstances. The Texas Gulf Sulphur case involved
a situation where a formal announcement to the entire financial news media had
been promised in a prior official press release. The Second Circuit in the United
States held that disclosure was not effective and that the news was not available
to the investing public until the promised official announcement was dissemi-
nated. 68 The trial judge, who had taken the position that disclosure became effec-
tive when the release was handed to the press,69 was reversed because the appellate
court considered the reading of a news release as only the first step in the dissemi-
nation process and required insiders to wait until the contents of the press release
could reasonably have been expected to appear over the Dow Jones broad tape.70
63. The criticism makes the point that opponents of insider liability could advance the same
argument.
64. See Borse ab Neujahr mit neuer Aussetzungspraxis, German Language News Reuter, Dec.
15, 1994 (concerning the relevant announcement of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange).
65. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 34. The affirmative duty to disclose information pursuant
to § 15 is one of the means for achieving this end. For the information hotline installed in the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange, see infra note 250.
66. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 46.
67. See Assmann, supra note 54, at 511-12.
68. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
69. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
70. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854.
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The court expressly limited its holding to information that can be acted upon
instantaneously. 7' The case did not call for a determination of whether a post-
announcement waiting period is required when the news in question is not easily
translatable into investment action.72 Because outsiders may need more time than
insiders to absorb and evaluate such information, the court in dicta added that
under such circumstances, insiders would be prohibited from acting immediately
upon the dissemination.73
Surprisingly, there are few other cases on point. One district judge took the
view that effective disclosure could not have been achieved within two minutes
of the release on the broad tape.7 4 By contrast, another district judge held that
an insider majority shareholder was under no duty to await the market's reaction
to favorable information before announcing a take-out tender offer.75 Therefore,
the issue of a post-announcement waiting period remains unresolved. Various
authorities have devised unofficial rules,76 but they are, of course, not binding
on the courts. 77
Under the German Act, it appears that a post-announcement waiting period
is not required. The materials point to the regulatory objective of establishing
and protecting an efficient capital market and consider it sufficient when market
participants have the opportunity to learn of disclosed information, be it over a
textline system accessible to the general public or otherwise.7 8 There is no refer-
ence to a time span for the market to digest disclosed information. The absence
of a waiting period suggests that information is considered publicly known imme-
diately after it has been carried on a system accessible to the general public. This
type of bright line rule is laudable, and it appears to reflect the realities of the
German market. Given that fewer than 700 stock corporations are listed on Ger-
man stock exchanges7 9 and that these companies are followed by security analysts
and professional investors, it appears that the market is well prepared for a wide
variety of corporate disclosure to be readily reflected in the market prices of
securities. U.S. commentators have advocated this position for issuers under
71. Id.
72. This issue became moot since the director, who bought about an hour and a half after the
broad tape had carried the news, died pending the appeal. Id. at 842 n.6.
73. Id. at 854 n.18.
74. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264,279-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
75. Billiard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 526 F. Supp. 218, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
76. See 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD 190.3 (1979) (suggesting a 15-minute waiting period); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE DISCLO-
SURE POLICIES 16-17 (1970) (24- or 48-hour period); ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 202(64)
(one-week period).
77. See Billiard, 526 F. Supp. at 220 (labeling the Bromberg & Lowenfels rule "mechanistic"
and "beyond the accepted understanding ... as to timeliness . of disclosure").
78. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 46.
79. Gerhard Wegen, Congratulations from Your Continental Cousins, JOb-5: Securities Fraud
from the European Perspective, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S61 (1993).
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similar media and analyst coverage, 8° even though the U.S. standard still seems
to be the actual reaction of the market price.8'
3. Materiality
The definition of inside information requires that inside information be of a
kind that, if disclosed, could have a substantial effect on the market price. 82 This
standard is more or less identical to the test applied in U.S. courts.
U.S. courts have developed a uniform definition of materiality under the com-
mon law, Rule lOb-5, and other provisions. 3 The Supreme Court stated that a
fact is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding [whether to buy, hold, or sell]. . . . Put
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure . . . would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information made available.' 8' Stemming from a proxy solicitation
decision, this test was expressly approved for insider trading purposes as the
Supreme Court rejected any notion of different standards of materiality depending
on the nature of the action. 85 Lower courts have used other tests to determine
whether a given fact is material. 86 Nonetheless, all these tests focus on the market
impact of such information as perceived by the reasonable investor.87 This stan-
dard basically matches the concept of materiality as adopted by the EC Insider
Trading Directive.88
The wording of the German Act appears more expansive with regard to what
information will qualify as "suitable" to substantially affect the market price,
whereas the EC Directive covers information that is "likely" to have a significant
effect on the price. The likelihood test appears to involve a higher degree of proba-
bility, but it is doubtful whether the German legislature intended to deviate from
the European Community standard in this respect. The wording of the statute sug-
gests that the probability of the effect on the market price be assessed from the
80. LANGEVOORT, supra note 28, at 148; Loss, supra note 15, at 3509.
81. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'dper curiam, 725 F.2d
9, 11 (Ist Cir. 1984).
82. German Act § 13.
83. See, e.g., Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., 661 F. Supp. 1555, 1562 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd
on other grounds, 855 F.2d 987, 991 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
84. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
85. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 225, 238, 240 n.18 (1988); see also Harkavy v. Apparel
Indus. Inc., 571 F.2d 737, 741 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18
(2d Cir. 1977).
86. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (indicating the actual market
impact of the information); Lilly v. Teachers Retirement Bd., 608 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 939 (1980) (trading by the insider or tippee).
87. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 240.
88. EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, art. 1(1): "information which . . . if it were
made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the [security]."
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standpoint of a reasonable investor, which is an objective standard. 89 It is hard to
imagine a case where the German and U.S. standards would yield different results.
Materiality typically becomes an issue when the information is contingent or
speculative so that there is not a certain price movement, but only a possible one. 90
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari of Texas Gulf Sulphur, in which materi-
ality had been held to depend on "a balancing of both the indicated probability that
the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality
of the company activity." 9' This test has been applied to a variety of situations,
including secret merger negotiations92 and the communication of unverified infor-
mation. 93 Evidence for making materiality determinations has been found in the
actual market impact94 as well as in the very act of trading by the insider or tippee.95
However, the ultimate determination of materiality depends on the circumstances
of each particular case 96 and will be determined by the jury. 9
At this time, it is impossible to predict how the German courts will construe
the materiality standard. This uncertainty is partly due to the circumstances sur-
rounding "soft" information. Some guidance can be derived from language re-
quiring a significant effect on the market price, which would exclude de minimis
cases. The materials, as well as the majority of commentators, consider as signifi-
cant any price movement which official traders would have to announce as a plus
or minus tendency. 98 However, the U.S. experience suggests that the emergence of
a bright-line rule is unlikely.
4. Types of Material Information
Regarding the type of information referred to, the German standard is all-
encompassing. The information may, but need not, pertain to the issuer, or it may
89. See Hopt, ZGR, supra note 55, at 32; Assmann, supra note 54, at 514.
90. For a general assessment of the materiality issue, see Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality
and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723 (1989).
91. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
92. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 225 (1988).
93. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The reversal
concerned only the duty to disclose, not the question of materiality.
94. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980).
95. Lilly v. Teachers Retirement Bd., 608 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
939 (1980); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977).
96. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 239; see also SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir.
1976).
97. Summary judgment or a directed verdict is rarely appropriate. See Goldman v. Belden, 754
F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985); Lilly, 608 F.2d at 63.
98. Bedingungen far Geschdfte an den deutschen Wertpapierborsen, reprinted in EBERHARD
SCHWARK, B6RSENGESETZ 639 (1994) (e.g., 5% price movement regarding stock); see BT-DrS 12/
6679, supra note 48, at 47; Assmann, supra note 54, at 514; Assmann, supra note 41; BT-DrS 12/
6679, supra note 48, § 13; Klaus J. Hopt, 159 ZEITSCHRIFT F0R DAs GESAMTE HANDELS- UND
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 135, 154 (1995). For a more lenient standard, see Claussen, supra note
55, at 30.
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concern another issuer, as well as the security itself.99 This standard appears not
to differ substantially from the concept of material information as used in the United
States, where language in Chiarella and Dirks suggests that the Supreme Court
refuses to draw any distinction between different kinds of information. "
In both the United States and Germany, issuer-related information would com-
prise events like a forthcoming change of control,'0 ' expansion or reduction of
the share capital,'0 2 the entry into important contractual relationships, plans to go
into a new and profitable line of business, 0 3 the infliction of important liabilities,
important inventions, and everything else that has a bearing on the issuer's finan-
cial situation. The information need not even originate within the issuer's
sphere.'04 Security-related information would include the trading volume in the
security, the origin of high-volume orders, plus or minus announcements,' 5 and
any other market data, as well as projections and estimates.106
Evaluations, recommendations, and the like constitute inside information only
when they are at the very least based on some information that has not become
public knowledge. 107 Consequently, analysts, journalists, and investors do not
create inside information by simply collecting publicly available information
for the assessment of securities with a view toward publishing a buy or sell
recommendation. 0 8 However, where a third party knows that an analyst or inves-
tor has established or is in possession of such an evaluation, the knowledge may,
under certain circumstances, qualify as inside information. For example, the
editor of a news agency who learns that an evaluation will be published possesses
inside information even if the evaluation draws only on publicly known informa-
tion. '09
D. INSIDERS AND NONINSIDERS
As outlined above, the duty to abstain from trading on inside information under
the German Act is not limited to insiders. However, the distinction between
99. German Act § 13.
100. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 n.15.
101. Atlantic Litigation, supra note 51.
102. Western Hemisphere Group v. Stan West Corp., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) at 91,858 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1984) (going public with new issue); SEC v. Hall,
[1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,292 (D.C.C. Feb. 22, 1980) (repurchase
of shares).
103. SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
104. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 n.15.
105. The official trading agents of German Stock Exchanges are required to disseminate plus or
minus announcements when the trading volume is expected to significantly change the market price.
SCHWARK, supra note 98.
106. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
107. German Act § 13(2).
108. See also recital 14 of the directive.
109. Assmann, supra note 54, at 516; Claussen, ZEITSCHRIFr FOR BANKRECHT UND BANK-
WIRTSCHAFr [ZBB] 267, 276 (1992); Hopt, ZGR, supra note 55, at 34; Hopt, FS BEUSCH, supra
note 55, at 410.
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insiders and noninsiders remains important because the German Act imposes
additional obligations on insiders."0
1. Insiders
The German Act defines insiders as persons who possess inside information
by virtue of one of three specified links to the issuer. "' The first group of persons
having such a link consists of members of the management or supervisory board. '12
This situation is not fundamentally different from that in the United States where
persons are insiders when they are fiduciaries of the issuer, which is clearly the
case with directors and officers. 113 However, the German Act is more expansive
in that it affords insider status not only to directors and officers of the issuer,
but also to directors and officers of affiliated companies. "' As the German Act
fails to define this concept, it is proposed that a definition come from the test
set out in Section 15 of the Stock Corporation Act, where the expression "affiliated
companies" appears as a technical term. 5 With this understanding, insider status
would extend to board members of companies either being controlled by or having
control over the issuer, with control being presumed when one company possesses
more than 50 percent of the voting power in the other company. With the express
coverage of affiliated companies, the German legislature made use of its power
to adopt provisions more stringent than those laid out in the EC Insider Trading
Directive. 116
The second group of insiders consists of persons who have access to inside
information by virtue of their holdings in the capital of the issuer. The wording
is clear as to the requirement that the relationship between share ownership and
access to inside information must be one of causation, and nothing else.' This
approach seems slightly different than in the United States as the Supreme Court
rejected a theory of insider liability that rested on access to inside information
alone." Yet the courts, though without much analysis, treat controlling share-
holders as insiders, like directors and officers," 9 and even award insider status
110. German Act § 13; see infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
111. The legislative process has coined the terms primary and secondary insider, which have
become part of the commentators'jargon. Insiders under the German Act are labeled primary insiders,
whereas third parties, since they are nevertheless subject to the duty to abstain from trading, are
called secondary insiders.
112. The German Act also mentions general partners of a limited partnership by shares (Komman-
ditgesellschaft auf Aktien).
113. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
114. German Act § 13(1) no. 1.
115. Assmann, supra note 54, at 505-06.
116. The EC Directive requires board members of the issuer to be prohibited from trading. See
EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, art. 2(1).
117. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 46. For a critical discussion, see Claussen, supra note
55, at 27.
118. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
119. Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947).
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to "those having a special relationship affording access to inside information."
The test for insider status is "whether the person has access to confidential
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone."''2  With the access theory being rejected,12 ' this
test focuses not so much on the opportunity to learn of confidential information,
but rather on the relationship between the particular shareholder and the corpora-
tion. It has been proposed that the extension of insider obligations should follow
the lines along which corporate law imposes fiduciary duties of fairness and
loyalty on controlling shareholders.122 It would follow that the insider status of
shareholders would depend on the positions they occupy in the web of corporate
relationships. 23
The third group of insiders consists of persons who possess inside information
by virtue of their employment or the exercise of their profession or duties. Thus,
employees, notwithstanding their rank in the corporate hierarchy, are insiders
when they receive nonpublic information in the course of their employment. It
is not enough that they happen to learn of the information through their employ-
ment or by chance.2 4 In contrast to this position, the SEC has taken the view
that it does not matter whether insiders receive nonpublic information outside the
activities that makes them fiduciaries. 2 5 As far as the trading of such information is
concerned, the German Act would reach the same result because employees who
receive inside information outside the course of their employment are nevertheless
required to abstain from trading under the general catch-all provision. 2 6 Hence,
neither in the United States nor in Germany may insiders trade on information
that comes to them in their noninsider capacities.
Furthermore, the definition extends to persons that the U.S. practice labels
constructive insiders or quasi-insiders or temporary insiders.127 As established
under U.S. practice, these insiders may be lawyers, investment bankers, accoun-
tants, and other professionals who are hired by the issuer and in the course of
their employment purposefully become entrusted with nonpublic information. 
21
120. Feldman, 679 F.2d at 1304 (citing Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
(1961)).
121. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
122. LANGEVOORT, supra note 28, at 72.
123. In Feldman, insider status was denied to a 14% shareholder who did not have representation
on the board. 679 F.2d at 1304. Yet, the court paid attention to the shareholder's access to information,
reasoning that in the case at bar "[he] had no such access." Id.
124. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 46; Claussen, supra note 57, at 27, 28.
125. SEC v. Finamerica Corp., Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 594, at A-5 (D.D.C. Mar. 11,
1981).
126. See infra text accompanying note 147.
127. The German Act does not require that there be a relationship between the possessor of
information and the issuer. See Hopt, FS BEUSCH, supra note 55, at 398-99; Hopt, ZGR, supra
note 55, at 38.
128. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n. 14 (1983); see also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
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The German Act does not require that these persons typically deal with such
information in pursuit of their duties.' 2 9 Notwithstanding, it is not enough to
learn of information merely on occasion of these professional activities. 30 For
example, messengers who open the files they are supposed to deliver or who
overhear conversations while on duty would not qualify as insiders (although
they would have to abstain from trading under the catch-all clause).
Under the wording of both the EC Insider Trading Directive and the German
Act, insider status does not turn on whether the professional has been hired by
or is performing services for the issuer. This fact is important when applied to
financial analysts and news reporters. When these professionals learn of nonpublic
information during interviews, background talks, factory tours, or by virtue of
their own research, they are arguably insiders with regard to that information. 131
In the United States, the liability of financial analysts and news reporters is a
grey area132 in insider trading regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that those who "ferret out and analyze information" and make it available to
investors play a socially valuable role as they enhance the efficiency of the securi-
ties marketplace. 133 In order not to deter these research efforts, the Court adopted
a rather restrictive test under which the insider-analyst does not incur liability
for disseminating such information to a client unless the client knows or has
reason to know that the information was passed on for the analyst's own benefit. 134
The problem with this approach is that the release of confidential information
can rarely be traced back to a single motive. 135 The German Act offers more
certainty, but this advantage is weakened by a rather inhibitive treatment of those
who enhance the efficiency of the marketplace.
2. Noninsiders
The German Act with its catch-all clause prohibits any trading on nonpublic
information without regard to insider status, whereas U.S. law offers avenues
for noninsiders to trade with impunity. For example, under Rule lOb-5, liability
attaches only to tippees,136 or under the misappropriation theory.13 Both these
129. Hopt, ZGR, supra note 55, at 38.
130. Assmann, supra note 54, at 494, 507; Karl-Burkhard Caspari, ZGR, 530, 538 (1994).
131. Assmann, supra note 54, at 494, 507-08; Caspari, supra note 130. For a brief overview,
see Wenig Licht im Paragraphen-Dschungel, NEUE ZORICHER ZEITUNG, Nov. 1, 1994.
132. LANGEVOORT, supra note 28, at 347.
133. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983). For an analysis of the function of investment
analysts, see Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127
(1984); Coni Rae Good, Comment, An Examination of Investment Analyst Liability Under Rule
lOb-5, 1984 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 129.
134. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662-64.
135. For a more detailed discussion, see LANGEVOORT, supra note 28, at 352.
136. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
137. The misappropriation theory has its roots in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236
(1980), and has been largely adopted in the Second Circuit. See United States v. Chestman, 947
F.2d 551, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 599 (2d
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avenues of liability depend on the breach of a fiduciary duty. Tippee liability is
derivative from the liability of the tipper; unless the insider-tipper has violated
a fiduciary duty to the corporation for personal gain, the tippee is not liable,
even if the tippee trades on the information received for personal gain. 138 Under
the misappropriation theory, the basis for liability is that the person in possession
of inside information breaches a fiduciary duty owed to anyone other than the
issuer's shareholders.' 39 Furthermore, noninsiders are prohibited from trading
on inside information in connection with tender offers under Rule 14e-3. This
rule does not require a breach of a fiduciary duty, but applies where nonpublic
information relating to the commencement of a tender offer is directly or indirectly
acquired from either the bidder or the target company.
As with Rule 14e-3, the German Act does not incorporate any fiduciary ele-
ment. Both insiders and noninsiders who, with full knowledge of the facts, possess
inside information are under the same obligation to abstain from trading when
trading would constitute an exploitation of such information.'4o For example, the
employee who randomly sees a document containing inside information may not
trade on it with impunity. Even someone who is not employed with the issuer
and accidentally overhears inside information must abstain from trading. The
materials show that the German legislature purposefully adopted a broad catch-all
provision. 14' An earlier draft had proposed that noninsiders should be liable only
if they know or should have known that the information emanated directly or
indirectly from an insider. The EC Insider Trading Directive imposes restrictions
on noninsiders only if the source could not be other than an insider.' 42 The catch-all
prohibition is thus another point on which the German legislature exercised its
power to reach beyond the EC Insider Trading Directive.
As a result, the German Act plugs many of the fine exceptions and loopholes
that have been known to exist under U.S. law. There is no immunity for those
who acquire information totally by chance,143 those who learn of the information
from a family member,'" or those who ferret out nonpublic information by their
Cir. 1993); United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1993). However, the Supreme
Court has not ruled on its viability. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658; Carpenter
v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
138. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
139. See cases cited supra note 137. For an analysis of the theory, see Barbara B. Aldave,
Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 101 (1984).
140. German Act § 14.
141. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 48.
142. EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, art. 4. As to the background of the wording,
see M. Schodermeier & M. Wallach, Die Insider-Richtlinie der Europdischen Gemeinschafl, 1990
EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EuZW] 122, 123. For a discussion of the
problems arising thereunder, see Hopt, ZGR, supra note 55, at 48-49; Claussen, supra note 109,
at 274.
143. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
144. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
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own diligence. 145 The only group not covered under the German regime consists
of tippees who do not know the factual background of the tip. Under the catch-all
clause, insider liability rests on the knowledge of inside information, and the tip
by itself does not qualify.
E. OBLIGATIONS
The discussion of insider and noninsider status under the German Act reveals
that two different sets of duties apply. First, both insiders and noninsiders are
forbidden to trade on inside information. Second, insiders are required to abstain
both from divulging inside information and from using it for the purpose of
issuing buy or sell recommendations. These restrictions are akin to the noninsider
tippee restriction on trading under Rule lOb-5, but address the problem from the
opposite side.
1. The General Prohibition: Abstention from Trading
The German Act mandates that both insiders and noninsiders who have full
knowledge of the facts may not take advantage of inside information by acquiring
or disposing of, for their own account or for the account of a third party, either
directly or indirectly, insider securities of the issuer (or issuers) to which that
information relates.' 46 However, the Act has no rule similar to Section 16(b) of
the Exchange Act that would prohibit directors, officers, and certain shareholders
from transacting short sales in the issuer's equity securities.
Some commentators take the view that the German Act outlaws every exploita-
tion of inside information, not just in connection with a purchase or sale. They
argue that the obligation also extends to insiders who, with full knowledge of
the facts, abstain from transactions they would have carried out had they not
possessed inside information. 147 Apart from doubts as to whether identification
of such a situation will ever be practicable, this argument is not very convincing.'
48
The criminal nature of an insider violation calls for a strict construction of the
statutory language. The wording mentions only two actions: purchase and sale.
The language provides no basis for applying the criminal law concept that holds
a perpetrator liable for passivity in the face of a duty to act. 149 This rule might
apply when criminal liability attaches to a certain result, such as the victim being
dead or injured or assets being destroyed or damaged. However, the liability of
insider traders attaches to an action. The wording does not mention or refer to
145. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
146. German Act § 14.
147. Claussen, supra note 109, at 281; Klaus J. Hopt, FESTSCHRIFT FOR HEINSIUS S. 293 (1991);
Weber, supra note 9, at 2853.
148. See Heinz-Dieter Assmann, AG 237, 246 (1994).
149. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] § 13 (German Criminal Code).
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an element such as a profit from the transaction. Hence, there should be no
grounds to punish loss-avoiding insider abstention. 5 o
Important consequences arise from the requirement that the trader must exploit
inside information to be liable. Several groups of professionals involved in the
market, such as stockbrokers and market makers, cannot avoid possessing secu-
rity-related inside information. Whether they incur liability depends on whether
they exploit their knowledge of inside information. For example, executing a
client's order concerning securities of which the broker or market maker possesses
inside information would not incur liability if the broker or market maker does
not take advantage of the inside information personally.151
Fine lines separate the trading with impunity from a violation. The stockbroker
will be liable for aiding and abetting when the stockbroker knows that the client
possesses inside information and is attempting to take advantage of it by placing
the order. Likewise, when the client places an order in a manner that allows the
broker to exercise discretion,' 52 the broker can hardly avoid employing personal
knowledge for the promotion of the client's interests.
A person with inside knowledge could try to get around the problem by finding
another broker who does not share the information. 153 Theoretically, this broker
could belong to the same firm. The prosecution would have to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the broker who conducted the transaction possessed inside
information, without the help of a legal theory that would impute the knowledge
of broker A to broker B.
The requirement of exploitation also furnishes the key to the liability of those
who trade on self-created information. In the United States this issue most often
arises in the context of tender offers, as it has become a standard operation for
the bidder to buy as much stock in the open market as possible before making
the offer. 154 Without doubt, knowledge about an upcoming tender offer or block
purchase is security-related information and the trading on it would be clearly
prohibited under the German Act. In the United States, however, a bidder trying
to gain a foothold in the target corporation will be outside the scope of Rule
14e-3. Likewise, since a prospective bidder usually does not owe fiduciary duties
to the issuer or its shareholders, no violation of Rule lOb-5 will take place under
such circumstances. 1
55
The German Act does not explicitly address the issue of self-created information
150. Accord Klaus J. Hopt, ZGR 17, 45 (1991).
151. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 47; see also EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note
5, pmbl.
152. This is the case not only with unlimited orders but also with discretionary orders.
153. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 47.
154. Pursuant to Rule 13d-I under the Exchange Act, the acquisition of more than 5% of any
class of stock must be disclosed within 10 days.
155. The only avenue of liability under Rule lOb-5 appears to be the misappropriation theory.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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because the legislature assumed that trading in securities under such circumstances
is not an exploitation of inside information.156 Likewise, the EC Insider Trading
Directive, in its preamble, states that since the acquisition or disposal of securities
necessarily involves a prior decision to acquire or dispose, the carrying out of
that decision would not constitute in itself the use of inside information. 57
The issue becomes more complex when the potential purchaser of a block of
shares, in the course of negotiations, requests access to corporate documents.
The materials explain that such a purchaser is not deemed to acquire inside
information with regard to the block under negotiation. 158 However, the legislature
apparently assumed that any purchase of additional shares in the open market
would constitute a use of inside information.' 59 This result has been criticized
as complicated and conflicting with the legislative purpose of protecting equal
investment opportunities.'60 Certainly, this rule is complicated, but a more restric-
tive approach would ignore the realities of corporate mergers and acquisitions,
as there will always be a point at which the prospective purchaser will ask for
confidential information. 16' The criticism is valid to the extent it complains about
the incompleteness of the statutory language. Indeed, it is hard to understand that
the German Act offers no guidance on how lawfully to continue a well-established
practice in merger negotiations when the violation carries with it up to five years
of imprisonment.
2. Further Obligations for Insiders
The duty to abstain from trading applies not only to insiders but to everybody
who possesses inside information. Apart from this, the German Act imposes
additional duties on insiders. First, insiders may not, without authorization, di-
vulge or make accessible inside information to any third party.162 The criterion
"without authorization" is designed to distinguish situations in which disclosure
is made in the normal course of the exercise of the insider's employment, profes-
sion, or duties from other improper ways of releasing information. However, it
is not always clear what "without authorization" actually means. For example,
when a prospective purchaser of a controlling block of shares in the course of
performing due diligence measures asks the officers of the target for access to
nonpublic information, the officers probably commit an insider violation if they
comply with the request. In the context of German corporate culture (which has
156. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 47.
157. EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, pmbl.
158. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 47.
159. Id.
160. Weber, supra note 9, at 2853.
161. For the declining role of the release of confidential information in the course of due diligence
measures and the acquirers' increasing reliance on public filings after the appearance of hostile tender
offers in the United States, see JAMES FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER (Supp. 1985).
162. German Act § 14.
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been hostile to disclosure in many respects), it cannot be excluded that the officers
would be held to deviate from the normal course of the exercise of their duties
when they grant access. This is extremely annoying because, contrastingly to
tipper liability under Rule 1Ob-5, the officers of the target would be liable regard-
less of whether the person acting on behalf of the purchaser (tippee) engages in
securities trading. 163 Second, insiders may not recommend or procure a third
party, on the basis of inside information, to acquire or dispose of insider securi-
ties. '"
Compared with Rule lOb-5, these rules tackle the tipper/tippee situation from
the other side. Under Rule lOb-5, insiders passing on information will breach
their fiduciary duties only if they personally benefit, directly or indirectly, from
such disclosure. 65 Without a fiduciary element, the German Act needs to impose
additional duties on potential tippers to prevent collusion between insiders and
front men, and to prevent circumvention generally.
3. Further Issues Concerning Noninsider Traders
As to noninsiders, the German Act imposes a more expansive ban than its
counterpart in the EC Insider Trading Directive.'66 The directive imposes liability
on noninsiders who possess inside information whose direct or indirect source
could not be other than an insider. '67 Germany did not adopt this limitation. 68
An important issue easily overlooked concerns the liability of noninsiders for
the aiding and abetting of insiders who divulge inside information or recommend
the buying or selling of securities. Consider a noninsider who, on the basis of
inside information, recommends to another person the purchase or disposal of
securities. The noninsider may recommend such action with impunity, unless
the noninsider simultaneously divulges the insider information leading to the
recommendation. Contrastingly, an insider will be liable for such recommenda-
tions regardless of the handling of the insider information. Whether these results
reflect the drafters' intentions is so doubtful that the question arises whether the
legislature in fact considered the general rules on aiding and abetting in the
legislative drafting. Commentators favor a uniform standard of liability and take
the unexplained distinctions as corroborative evidence of legislative misdrafting
and bad public policy.' 69
163. Weber, supra note 9, at 2853.
164. German Act § 14.
165. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
166. Article 6 of the EC Insider Trading Directive allows the Member States to adopt provisions
more stringent than those of the directive.
167. See EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, art. 4.
168. See supra text accompanying note 142.
169. Assmann, supra note 54, at 521 et seq.; see Weber, supra note 9, at 2853.
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4. Scienter
Insider trading under the German Act is a criminal offense. Criminal liability
usually requires criminal intent. 170 The rule on insider trading goes further as it
requires not only full knowledge of the facts, but also that the trader purposefully
exploit the information to gain a financial advantage.
In this respect, German and U.S. law appear to have no major differences.
In the United States, an insider trader will be liable under Rule lOb-5 only for
acting with scienter. In addition, the defendant must have known that the informa-
tion leading to the trade was material and nonpublic. ' 7 'The U.S. Supreme Court
has held liable those who trade with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud
without deciding the issue of whether gross negligence will suffice to hold traders
liable. 72
F. SANCTIONS
The German legislature decided to apply criminal sanctions for the infringement
of the prohibitions on insider trading. The penalty for violations is imprisonment
of up to five years and no distinction is drawn between insiders and noninsiders. 17
Imprisonment of five years is a harsher sanction than those adopted in other EC
Member States, 7 4 and it is also harsher than the penalties for other white-collar
crimes under German law. Moreover, general criminal law entitles the Treasury
to seek from the defendant a disgorgement of the profits derived from the illegal
transactions. '7' These sanctions also apply when the defendant conducted trading
activities in violation of foreign insider prohibitions. 176 This point is important
with regard to German citizens because they would otherwise go unpunished for
the breach of foreign insider trading law, given that the German Constitution
prohibits their extradition to foreign authorities. With this set of sanctions in
place, it appears that the German legislature complied with the requirement of
the EC Insider Trading Directive to adopt penalties sufficient to promote compli-
ance with the ban on insider trading. 1
77
Both the EC Insider Trading Directive and the German Act are silent with
regard to the civil liability of insider traders and a private right of action, and
the same is true of the interpretive materials. In contrast to the United States
170. Unless the statute in question expressly includes negligence. German Criminal Code § 15.
171. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 328 (1986).
172. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
173. German Act § 38.
174. See Eddy Wymeersch, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING (Klause J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch
eds., 1990).
175. See German Criminal Code § 73.
176. German Act § 38.
177. EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, art. 13.
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where the availability of private actions under Rule lOb-5 has been beyond ques-
tion, 7 8 such a right is the subject of much debate in Germany.
The proponents of civil remedies point to Section 823(2) of the Bijrgerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB), a section of the Civil Code that provides for the compensation
of damages whenever the wrongdoer violates a rule designed to protect the claim-
ant. 179 It seems clear that the ban on insider trading functions for the protection
of those who trade in securities without sharing inside information. 80 The propo-
nents find support with the position of the European Parliament, as the majority
urged the Council to provide for the civil liability of insider traders to contempora-
neous traders on the other side.''
The opponents of civil remedies 182 invoke the preamble of the EC Insider
Trading Directive, which, in contrast to other directives in the area of financial
services, 183 fails to list investor protection as a motive for the legislation. There-
fore, it is argued that the ban on insider trading under the German Act would
not protect the individual investor, and the prohibition would thus fail to operate as
a protective rule under Section 823(2) BGB. Furthermore, and quite surprisingly,
opponents have even denied that investors need protection against insider trading.
They believe that the ban on insider trading protects the integrity of the capital
market and nothing else.'84
The issue, if it is ever resolved, is likely to be decided by the courts.' 85 The
courts would be bound by the wording of the statute, but would nevertheless
inquire into legislative intent. The interpretive materials, however, are silent on
the point, and the general sections are so cryptic that anyone might find support
for a particular position.
178. See Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). For a general discussion of
civil liability under SEC statutes and RICO, see Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 977 (3d ed. 1995).
179. Assmann, supra note 54, at 524; CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER, FESTSCHRIFT FUR KITAGAWA 665
(1992); see also Hopt, ZGR, supra note 55, at 60. But cf. Hopt, ZHR, supra note 98, at 159, 162.
180. For a discussion about who is actually harmed by insider trading, see William K.S. Wang,
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who
Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5? 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981).
181. EUR. PARL. Doc. (A 2-0055/58) (1988) (Hoon Report). In light of the difficulties of legal
harmonization and the continuous need for compromise, the fact that this initiative was unsuccessful
does not furnish proof of the legislature's disapproval. See Hopt, ZGR, supra note 55, at 60.
182. E.g., Caspari, supra note 130, at 533. Caspari is a high ranking official in the Ministry of
the Treasury and was involved with the drafting of the German Act; Wilhelm Happ, JURISTENZEITUNG
[JZ] 240, 243 (1994); Hopt, ZHR, supra note 109, at 159, 162; SIEGFRIED KOMPEL, KAPITAL-
MARKTRECHT 14.92 (1995).
183. One example is the directive 80/390/EEC of 17 March 1980 concerning the prospectus,
O.J. (L 100) 1 (1980).
184. Caspari, supra note 130, at 533.
185. Commentators call for the legislature to clarify the issue, see the minutes taken by Thomas
Trdliztsch, ZGR 547, 548 (1994), but the issue now seems to be left to the judicial branch. Legislative
action would appear to become more likely after a first case is decided by a higher court that encounters
widespread disapproval.
FALL 1996
578 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
There remain practical difficulties with a civil remedy, 116 which should not
surprise U.S. lawyers. Private rights of action long raised difficult conceptual
problems. Not until 1988 did Congress create an express right of action. 18 7 The
difficulties under German law are rooted in the requirement that under Section
823(2) BGB the plaintiff would have to prove causation. With respect to insider
trader liability, a showing would be required that the defendant's unlawful trading
activities were the legal cause of a certain price development, and that this develop-
ment was the legal cause of the plaintiffs losses.' 88 Unless legislative action
overcomes these difficulties, civil remedies are unlikely to play an important
role in the enforcement of the law on insider trading in Germany.
G. ENFORCEMENT
For the reasons just explained, governmental action is likely to be the most
common mechanism to enforce the prohibition against insider trading. The legisla-
ture appears to have done everything to make the Securities Office a powerful
watchdog over the securities market. Generally speaking, the Securities Office
is entrusted with the task of remedying defects and abuses in the securities market-
place. 189 In particular, market participants have to disclose any transaction in
securities or derivatives to the Securities Office. 90 The Securities Office is vested
with broad powers to investigate alleged violations and initiate their prosecu-
tion.' 9' Its officials may conduct extensive discovery with market participants
through access to their premises. When these investigations establish probable
cause of a violation, the Securities Office may interrogate those who might have
known of inside information or those working with the issuer or affiliated compa-
nies. These powers may be enforced with instruments similar to the contempt
powers of U.S. courts. Also, witnesses who might incriminate themselves enjoy
Miranda-type rights. 1
92
Insider trading cases frequently cross national boundaries. Therefore, the Secu-
rities Office must also use its investigating powers when authorities of other
European Union and European Economic Area member states request information
for the purpose of investigating insider violations under their laws. 193 Likewise,
the Securities Office is entitled to seek information from foreign authorities when
necessary for its own investigations. Furthermore, the Securities Office is allowed
to cooperate and exchange information with the authorities of nonmember states.
186. The proponents of civil remedies concede this point. See Assmann, supra note 54, at 525;
Assmann & Cramer, in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, supra note 41, § 14 n.108.
187. New § 20A, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
188. See Assmann, supra note 54, at 525; Ulrich Holschbach, NJW 2006, 2008 (1973).
189. German Act § 4.
190. Id. § 9.
191. Id. § 16.
192. STRAFPROZESSBORDNUNG [StPOl (Rules of Criminal Procedure).
193. German Act § 19.
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The question arises, however, whether the Securities Office is equipped with
the necessary manpower and technology. From the perspective of U.S. enforce-
ment, a staff of approximately one hundred officials does not seem large enough
to allow for the necessary supervision of the market.' 94 These numbers are not
conclusive evidence of insufficient personnel because the capitalization and trad-
ing volumes in the German market are much lower than in the United States.
Nevertheless, in looking at the data generated under the system of mandated
disclosure, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the Securities Office would
need considerably more personnel.1 95
As to the technology used for monitoring purposes, it has been alleged that
a considerable degree of insider trading will go undetected since the software
cannot detect certain trading patterns when they remain below given thresholds. 
196
There is no means to assess whether these allegations are true. German officials
may be happy with the creation of the Securities Office, which is a major achieve-
ment in itself. But foreign investors may remain skeptical until the Securities
Office has proven its ability to keep the market free from abusive and fraudulent
activities.
The staff at the Securities Office are determined to enforce the new regime
and combat every instance of insider trading. It is understandable that the investing
public is skeptical of a sweeping change in the attitude towards insider trading. 197
Yet not every criticism that skeptical commentators have suggested is well
founded. One commentator, after concluding that the driving forces behind the
German Act are increased competition for capital and international criticism,
doubts whether the new regulation will keep the market honest. The commentator
implies that Germany might allow prominent insider traders to go unpunished
as before.' 98 This allegation has no basis. The prominent person in question,
trade union leader Franz Steinkfihler, could not have been punished under the
old law because, at that time, Germany had no statute that made insider trading
a criminal offense. Nor could Steinkijhler have been fined under the self-
regulatory rules because he had not subscribed to them. Under the German Act
Steinkdhler's trading would clearly involve criminal liability.1 99 Suggesting that
Steinkiihler might again go unpunished is tantamount to suggesting that the Ger-
man authorities are corrupt. The commentator certainly did not intend to convey
194. Daniel J. Standan, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the Cold
Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177, 205 (1995).
195. Stafan Walter, Insider: Detailverliebt und uberkorrekt, FORBES, Feb. 1, 1995, at 56, 57
(comment of chairman of the Bremen Stock Exchange).
196. Id.
197. For an account of the situation prior to the new German Act, see Douglas A. Nystrom, The
Effects of the New EEC Draft Insider Trading Directive, 18 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 119 (1988);
Standan, supra note 194, at 191.
198. Standan, supra note 194, at 206.
199. Interestingly, Standan devotes 11 of roughly 30 pages to the situation as it existed prior to
the German Act and roughly four pages to the German Act itself.
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this message, but its implication furnishes an instructive example of the results
the combination of half-truths and speculation may produce.
Critics who fear that the Securities Office might be vulnerable to peer pressure
and react with leniency should not be concerned. The staff, including the heads of
the Securities Office, have been recruited from other federal and state government
branches. Few staff members have a banking background or other careers in
private practice. The staff are paid regular salaries pursuant to the laws for civil
servants and no extra bonuses are awarded. Given these facts, the staff and the
people it regulates can hardly be considered to be peers.
H. CONTROL AND COMPLIANCE
Special rules address the conduct of investment firms and the mechanisms
of internal supervision that the European legislature considers essential for the
protection of investors.2 Investment firms, among others, are not only required
to act with due skill, care, and diligence in the best interests of their clients, but
also to avoid conflicts of interest and, when they cannot be avoided, ensure that
their clients are fairly treated. 201 Further prudential rules require investment firms
to be structured and organized in such a way as to minimize the risk of clients'
interests being prejudiced by conflicts of interest between the firm and its clients
or between two different clients.2 °2 The use of Chinese Walls may avoid such
conflicts by preventing sensitive information from circulating through the whole
firm. But it is difficult to determine how many of these walls will be needed and
how high they must be. The consensus seems to be that within one firm those
who take orders from clients, those who deal on the account of the company,
those who initiate public offerings, those who grant loans, and those who do
research and analysis must be insulated from each other. 203 The situation is much
less clear as to when it is legitimate to jump over these walls.2 4
The German Act also requires that investment firms have other adequate inter-
nal control mechanisms to prevent violations of their duties.20 5 Every investment
firm must create an independent compliance department to keep a watch list of
securities the market for which is likely to be manipulated, and a highly confiden-
tial "red list" of securities that the firm may not trade in for its own account, issue
200. See Council Directive of 10 May 1993, supra note 7, at 27.
201. German Act § 31.
202. Id. § 33 no. 2.
203. See Dieter Eisele, WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1021, 1024 (1993); Ingo Koller, in
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, supra note 41, § 33 n.18.
204. German Act § 33 no. 3. Any strict insulation may conflict with the fair treatment obligation.
It has been proposed that investment firms should be allowed to tell their clients about the fact that
they possess confidential information when this is necessary to prevent them from incurring substantial
losses. See Koller, supra note 203, § 31 n.103.
205. For control mechanisms, compare Eisele, supra note 203, at 1204, with Koller, supra note
203, at 33 n.29.
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buy or sell recommendations, or purchase or dispose of for asset management
purposes. All employees of investment firms, not only those of the trading depart-
ments, are required to maintain their personal accounts with their employer and
to disclose all their transactions in securities to the compliance department." 6
II. Issuers' Affirmative Duty to Disclose
The law on insider trading not only introduces penalties for detected violations,
but attempts to eliminate the very existence of material nonpublic information
through the mandate that issuers whose securities trade in the first and second
segments of the market2 °7 disclose such information.20 8 The idea behind this ad
hoc disclosure is to cut back the frequency of insider trading through a regulation
of one of the factors contributing to an environment that facilitates personal gain
from the trading on nonpublic information.
Although neither U.S. courts nor the SEC have generally recognized such an
obligation, 2 9 the New York and American Stock Exchanges have similar rules.210
In practice, however, the disclosure obligations have had rather limited effect,
given that there may be important business reasons for keeping information confi-
dential. 21 Affirmative disclosure duties apply only when SEC rules and regula-
tions so require,212 when the issuer is selling or purchasing its stock in the mar-
ket,21 3 when the issuer makes a public statement that later becomes false or
214 215
misleading,21 4 or when rumors in the market are attributable to the issuer. Less
206. The Federal Banking Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt fdr das Kreditwesen) has issued rules for
bank and broker employees. Current version as of December 30, 1993, reprinted in Friedrich
Reischauer & Joachim Kleinhans, GESETZ OBER DAS KREDITWESEN [KWG] No. 845.
207. German Act § 15. In contrast to the rules on insider trading, the rule does not apply to
issuers of securities traded in the third segment (Freiverkehr). Compare id. §§ 15(1), 2(1) with
§ 12(1) no. 1.
208. This rule is mandated by article 7 of the directive. For a critical assessment, see Thomas
L. Hazen, Defining Illegal Insider Trading-Lessons from the European Community Directive on
Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231 (Autumn 1992).
209. Greenfield v. Heublein Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215
(1985); see Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir.
1986), vacated and remanded, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) [hereinafter Levinson Brief].
210. N.Y. Stock Exchange Co. Manual §§ 202.05,202.6, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,519,
23,520 (1989); Am. Stock Exchange Co. Guide §§ 401, 402, 2 Am. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH)
10,121, 10,122 (1992).
211. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (undisclosed merger negotiations).
212. Under the Exchange Act these include: annual reports on SEC Forms 10-K, quarterly reports
on SEC Form 10-Q, current reports on SEC Form 8-K, and various forms of registration statements
required under the Securities Act of 1933.
213. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 756; Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
214. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 607
F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d
10 (1st Cir. 1990); Greenfield v. Heublein Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984).
215. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981); Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH 1984 Transfer Binder) 91,470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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certain is the scope and extent of an affirmative duty to disclose when merger
negotiations, soft information, and bad financial news are concerned.216
With the German Act becoming effective, the mandated disclosure of material
nonpublic information has attracted much attention. This attention is due not only
to its immediate practical impact, but also to considerable uncertainties as to the
extent of the information that must be disclosed.
A. INFORMATION TO BE DISCLOSED
Section 15(1)1 places issuers under the affirmative duty to publish as soon as
practicable information that is new, has originated in the field of the issuer's
activities, is unknown to the public, and may substantially influence the market
price because it has a bearing on the issuer's asset and financial situation or its
general business prospects. This duty is not absolute, however, as the issuer may
ask the Securities Office for exemption under certain circumstances.2 7
To be subject to the disclosure duty, information must, in the first place, be
new. The word new seems to be a synonym for unknown to the public, which
is puzzling since the statutory language clearly requires information to be both
new and unknown to the public. Given that the interpretive materials do not
distinguish these tests,218 this construction appears to be the one that would come
closest to the legislature's intentions. If the word new carries a meaning on its
own, it would allow for an inference of the existence of old information, which,
even though unknown to the public, would be exempt from mandated disclosure
because it is not new. However, with a view to the purposes of the insider trading
prohibitions, the legislature is unlikely to have intended to carve out such an
exception.
The nonpublic nature of information again raises the question of whether it
is the public in a broader sense or the subset of market participants to whom
such information must be new. As the interpretive materials point out, it should
be the market participants whose knowledge matters.2"9 Whether this position
will be upheld in the courts is uncertain. 220 National legislation that transforms
an EC directive is to be construed in the light of the directive, and any party to
a lawsuit may submit to the European Court of Justice questions relating to the
construction of a directive. 22' To answer the question at hand, the EC Insider
Trading Directive refers to a particular schedule of the directive concerning the
216. Levinson Brief, supra note 209. For further discussion, see Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M.
Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure Obligations-An Analytical Framework for Merger Negotia-
tions, Soft Information and Bad News, 46 MD. L. REV. 923, 934-46 (1987).
217. See infra text accompanying notes 242-47.
218. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 48.
219. Id. The legisature thus follows the same sectoral access theory as under the insider trading
prohibition. See supra note 61.
220. See Assmann, supra note 54, at 527 n. 130.
221. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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admission of securities to trading on a market222 that in turn explicitly mandates
disclosure of information unknown to the broader public.223
Furthermore, information subject to mandated disclosure must have originated
in the field of the issuer's activities, have a bearing on the issuer's asset or
financial situation or its general business prospects, and therefore be likely to
substantially influence the market price or, regarding bonds, be likely to affect
the issuer's ability to fulfill its obligations. The interpretive materials offer some
guidance as to how to construe this language.
First, the duty does not apply to information to be disclosed within the yearly
reports and other reports mandated pursuant to the Stock Exchange Act.224 For
example, issuers of stock must disclose the call for a general meeting, decisions
concerning the payment of cash and stock dividends, and everything else affecting
the carrying out of stockholders' monetary rights.225 Issuers of bonds must disclose
everything concerning their exchange, redemption, or conversion as well as the
payment of interest.226 They must also disclose the issuance of new bonds includ-
ing the guarantees pertaining thereto. 227 All issuers must disclose proposed and
effectuated changes to the security holders' rights. 2 8 These events are outside
the scope of the German Act on ad hoc disclosure.
Second, the interpretive materials mention a few examples of what information
the legislature believed would affect the market price (or bond issuers' ability to
meet their obligations). 229 The holding company of the German Stock Exchanges
(Deutsche B6rse AG) has provided a guide.23 ° Some selected examples of changes
to the asset and financial situation include the disposal of core parts of the business,
merger agreements, corporate integrations, control agreements, acquisitions or
sales of a substantial participation, tender offers, adjustments of dividend rates,
overindebtedness, and material extraordinary expenditures or revenues.23'
Among the examples for changes in the general business prospects are significant
inventions or patents, the conclusion or termination of particularly significant
222. EC Insider Trading Directive, supra note 5, art. 7.
223. Schedule C.5(a) of the annex to Council Directive 79/279 of March 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21,
29.
224. B6RSENGESETZ (of 27 May 1908, RGB1.215, as amended 26 July 1994, BGBI.I 1749) § 44
(yearly report), § 44b (at least one additional report per year).
225. B6RSENZULASSUNGS-VERORDNUNG, supra note 60, § 63(1).
226. Id. § 63(2).
227. Id. § 66(2) no. 1.
228. Id. §§ 64, 66(1).
229. Examples include: the termination of important patent, purchase, or sales agreements; indus-
trial accidents requiring that important lines of business be shut down; and positive information such
as the closing of important agreements which might substantially affect the issuer's business and
financial situation. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 48.
230. DEUTSCHE B6RSE, INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS AND AD Hoc DISCLOSURE PURSUANT
TO THE GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT (1994). The guide is available in the English language
from Deutsche Borse AG, 60284 Frankfurt, Germany.
231. Id. at 36.
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contractual relationships, serious product liability or environmental damage
cases, legal disputes or antitrust proceedings of particular significance, and with-
drawal from or entry into new core business areas.2 32 The list is not exhaustive,
and the decision whether to disclose must turn on the circumstances of the individ-
ual case.
Disclosure is not mandated when the consequences of such developments are
still uncertain or when countervailing steps may be taken.233 Moreover, the inter-
pretive materials point out that the disclosure rules are not designed to impose
on issuers the dilemma either to disclose information and surrender competitive
advantages or to continuously apply for waivers with the Securities Office.234
The foregoing is particularly important with regard to decisions of a board involv-
ing the investigation, planning, and preparation of business activities. The duty
to disclose cannot arise as long as these developments have not reached the point
at which they are ready for implementation. 35
With regard to whether such information is likely to affect the market price,
236the legislature recommends commonsense assessments on a case-by case basis.
This explanation provides little guidance. Indeed, it is difficult to generalize
where to draw the line between important and nonimportant information, given
that issuers vary in size and activities. Critics maintain that the disclosure rules
result in a data overkill, 237 and officials with the Securities Office have complained
about extreme differences from issuer to issuer regarding their understanding of
what information must be disclosed.238 The ramifications for the negotiation of
mergers and acquisitions are completely unclear.239 Legal certainty is urgently
needed, and the Securities Office's practice will be extremely important in clarify-
ing the issue. Legal certainty is particularly important in light of the standard
of care that the legislature expects to be observed. Even though liability does
not attach when through simple negligence issuers fail to disclose information,2'4
the interpretive materials express the view that an issuer must seek advice from
its investment bank, other providers of investment services, lawyers, or other
outside experts whenever its own personal resources cannot furnish the skills
necessary for a proper evaluation. 24' This interpretation makes clear that the
232. Id. at 37.
233. Siegfried Kimpel, in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, supra note 41, § 15 n.53.
234. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 48.
235. Kumpel, supra note 233, § 15 n.52; see also Klaus J. Hopt, WM-FESTGABE FOR HELLNER
29, 33 (1994).
236. Id.
237. Walter, supra note 195, at 57.
238. See Deutschland: Wittich sieht mehr Informationswillen bei Firmen, Reuter German Language
News, Apr. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txprim File.
239. For the impact of disclosure obligations on the tactics of corporate acquisitions in the United
States, see FREUND, supra note 161, at 8 n.6, 12.
240. See German Act § 39(1).
241. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 48.
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legislature does not wish to see defendants escape liability simply because they
lack the necessary expertise.
B. EXEMPTION FROM THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
The rule on disclosures comes with one exception, as mandated by the EC
Insider Trading Directive. 242 An issuer may request of the Securities Office an
exemption from the duty to disclose when the disclosure of particular information
would be likely to harm the issuer's legitimate business interests.243 In light of
the legislature's announcement that the rule should not serve to make issuers
surrender competitive advantages, 2 " protection against competitors appears to
be a reason for obtaining the waiver.245 Practice will show whether other circum-
stances will qualify under the legitimate business interests test. In any event, the
issuer will need to prove every element of such a case.
According to the statutory language the Securities Office "may" grant the
waiver. This brings into play the whole doctrine pertaining to the discretion of
German public authorities.246 Discretion in this context does not mean arbitrari-
ness. In a nutshell, the doctrine requires the executive to consider all the circum-
stances relevant to promote the purposes of the law and to give them due weight
in making the decision. The Securities Office will thus have to evaluate fully the
interests of the issuer and the trading public. In some cases, the decision may
go either way even after a full evaluation of the circumstances. In other cases,
the weight of facts and arguments may be so overwhelming that the discretionary
powers shrink to zero and a particular decision is mandated. For example, in
the face of a realistic effort to save an issuer from bankruptcy, or when the issuer
still has to acquire the land where an ore strike has been made a waiver should
be granted. In such situations an unsuccessful applicant would have a chance to
obtain preliminary relief in an administrative court, if the judge found that with
the waiver being denied, the benefits for the marketplace would be outweighed
by the harm being done to the issuer's legitimate business interests.247
C. STEPS OF DISCLOSURE
The disclosure process can be outlined as follows: first, the issuer must inform
both the Securities Office and the management of the stock exchanges concerned
242. Compare article 7 and its reference to Directive 79/279/EEC.
243. German Act § 15(1).
244. See supra text accompanying note 234.
245. Weber, supra note 9, at 2854.
246. For the application of this concept in the context of the exemption in question, see Hopt,
ZHR, supra note 98, at 157; Kfimpel, supra note 233, § 15 n.76.
247. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] § 80(5) (Administrative Courts Act). The rejection
of a waiver application is an administrative act.
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as soon as practicable; 248 second, the issuer has to publish the information in at least
one newspaper with more than regional readership249 or via a computer-supported
information system that is admitted at the stock exchange and used by the market
participants; 250 finally, the issuer must provide the Securities Office and the stock
exchange management with a copy of the publication.25'
When the issuer applies for a waiver, it must do so as soon as practicable. If
the Securities Office denies the request, disclosure also is to be made as soon
as practicable. 52 An analogous situation applies when the issuer fails to obtain
temporary relief in the administrative court.
D. SANCTIONS
Intentional or reckless violations of the disclosure provisions are subject to
criminal penalties. A common rule of thumb defines recklessness as the failure
to observe what everybody would find striking if not observed.253 The maximum
fine is DM3 million,254 a tremendous increase, given that in the past there was
either no duty to disclose or a maximum fine of DM 100,000.255 The original
bill had started with a maximum fine of up to DM 0.5 million,256 a figure that
has been retained for certain technical violations.257
Whether nondisclosure should give third parties a private right to recover was
one of the most contested issues during the legislation process. Tort law provides
an opening for liability,25 ' but the deliberations resulted in an explicit statement
that a violation of the German Act alone does not trigger tort liability.259 While
this statement does not exclude other bases for a recovery under the law of torts, 2 60
248. The stock exchange management may use the information only for the decision whether or
not to suspend trading. See German Act § 15(2)2.
249. Borsenpflichtblatn. Any stock exchange may designate one or more newspapers as carriers
of official announcements.
250. At the Frankfurt Stock Exchange three providers of information services have established
a joint venture to provide a single hotline for the purpose of funneling such information from the
issuer to the stock exchange management, the Federal Securities Office, and the Federal Gazette.
See Gemeinschaftsunternehmen ftir Ad-hoc-Publizitiit, KREDITWESEN 29 (1996).
251. German Act § 15(2)(4).
252. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 49; see also Weber, supra note 9, at 2854.
253. Cramer, in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, supra note 41, § 39 n.12.
254. German Act § 39. At the time of this writing, this is equivalent of roughly two million U.S.
dollars.
255. Formerly B6RSENGESETZ, supra note 224, § 90(3).
256. BT-DrS 12/6679, supra note 48, at 58.
257. Noncompliance with the order to inform the Securities Office and the stock exchange manage-
ment before publishing in the media could trigger tort liability. There are other enumerated violations
for which the fine is up to 100,000 DM.
258. BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 823(2).
259. German Act § 15(6).
260. Liability under the law of torts may still arise under BGB § 826 or under BGB § 823(2) in
conjunction with other protection statutes such as the criminal law rules on fraud.
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those tort rules would present the plaintiff with a considerably higher burden,
given that they require a showing of the issuer's intent to deceive or defraud.26" '
E. FURTHER ISSUES
The affirmative duty to disclose material nonpublic information has been the
most contentious provision of the entire legislative package. In theory, mandated
disclosure works to eliminate nonpublic information. The rule should thus reduce
one of the factors contributing to an environment that facilitates the trading on
inside information. However, doubts have been expressed with regard to several
issues. As one argument goes, the availability of more information will not signifi-
cantly reduce insider trading.262
Another group of critics makes the point that the rule does more harm than
good. Some of them focus on the uncertainty pertaining to the relevance of
information and maintain that steering a middle course of disclosing neither too
much nor too little information is tantamount to the passing between Scylla and
Charybdis.263 One critic even fears that the Securities Office's supervisory practice
will be dominated by a lack of pragmatism and the allegedly German virtue
of hyper-correctness, all of which would bring chaos to the German financial
marketplace. 264 The critics expect that all these factors will entice issuers to direct
more of their attention to other instruments of fund raising. Regarding smaller
corporations whose securities trade in the second tier of the market, some bankers
appear to be optimistic about the potential for private placements, so that many
issuers may consider going private .265 Also, large issuers are expected to raise
increasing amounts of capital in New York or London rather than in Frankfurt.266
These results would be detrimental to all shareholders because these movements
would trigger a general decrease of stock prices .267 These views have not gone
uncontested, however. Several experts believe that the market will find its balance
after a transitional period of about two years.265
A third string of criticism points to the misproportion between the quantity of
generated data and the number of supervisory staff. At least one commentator
believes that the Securities Office will need four times more personnel than
261. BGB § 826; StGB §§ 263, 15. This is comparable to the law in the United States where
insider liability is contingent upon the showing of scienter. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (declining to address whether recklessness is sufficient for liability under Rule
lOb-5).
262. Hazen, supra note 185, at 208.
263. For the most comprehensive overview of the different lines of criticism, see Walter, supra
note 195, at 56-57.
264. Id. (comment of chairman of the German Brokers' Association).
265. Id. (comment of the CEO of Bank Liechtenstein in Germany).
266. Id. (comment of the president of DSW, a nonprofit proxy solicitation association).
267. Id.
268. Id. (comment ofthe directors ofBanque Lambert Bruxelles (Germany) and the Munich Stock
Exchange).
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currently planned,26 9 but nobody knows where the money to pay additional person-
nel should come from.
III. Conclusion
With the new provisions relating to insider trading and mandated disclosure,
Germany's financial markets have entered a new era. The German Act allows
Germany to catch up with international standards. With the laudable decision to
provide definitions of persons and transactions to be sanctioned rather than relying
on fiduciary principles, the German legislature has mastered a task that the U.S.
Congress has not achieved. Despite some differences with regard to activities
such as the acquisition of shares before a tender offer, analyst estimates derived
from information known to the public, legitimate market making, and brokerage
and stabilization activities (where the U.S. rules are more comprehensive) as
well as remote tippees (where the German Act is more comprehensive), there
can be no doubt that the German Act has established a regime that strikes a
balance between the need for legal certainty and the fear of overregulation.
Unfortunately, the regime of mandated disclosure still needs improvement.
Considerable uncertainty attaches to the question of what information is subject
to the duty to disclose. Despite colorful criticism, the first eighteen months of
the German Act have not furnished proof that the new regime will suffer the
predicted money-drain into foreign capital markets.
Two major weaknesses of the legislative package remain. First, the issue of
a private right of action against insider traders is likely to remain unresolved for
quite some time. Second, Germany still has to deal with allegations of weak
enforcement powers in the financial market. How the new regime will work in
practice remains to be seen. Many of the problems discussed will probably be
resolved in light of business realities, meaning that such decisions are likely to
parallel solutions found in U.S. regulation. Much attention will focus on the
Securities Office's determination and ability to enforce the new regime. The staff
is highly motivated and takes its task very seriously.
Despite some allegations to the contrary, the Securities Office possesses the
ability to ensure compliance with the provision of this new German Securities
Trading Act.27 °
269. Id. (comment of the chairman of the Bremen Stock Exchange).
270. In 1995 the Securities Office investigated 60 cases of insider trading. Six cases were pending
with the office; seven cases were handed over to district attorneys. Two insider traders were fined,
two files were closed, and the other cases were pending. See KREDITWESEN 215 (1996).
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